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GROUP INSOLVENCY – FORUM – EC
REGULATION AND MODEL LAW UNDER THE




A period of seven years is a good time to revisit my paper given in the
symposium, Bankruptcy in the Global Village: The Second Decade, and
published in 2007 as Group Insolvency—Choice of Forum and Law: The
European Experience Under The Influence of English Pragmatism.1
Choice of forum and law for group insolvencies has developed
considerably since the publication of my paper, but I am glad to say that, at
present, the triumph of English pragmatism is complete and has reached the
highest judicial level—that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The case law of the ECJ, sometimes more grandly and accurately
referred to as the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEU),
does not normally cite any national case law at all in its judgments. The
ECJ normally only cites its own cases. However, while the judgments of the
Court itself are usually quite brief and to the point, the Advocate General,
who has no exact replica in a common law system, usually provides a
longer and more detailed initial judgment. The Advocate General is a
French law-based concept.2 He reads the written submissions, attends the
oral hearing, and writes an opinion for the Court to consider. In most cases,
his opinion is accepted and his more detailed reasons can be treated as the
justifications for the Court’s brief decisions. If, however, the Court
disagrees with the Advocate General, the Advocate General’s opinion is
sometimes said to be treated like a dissenting judgment.3
One very serious disadvantage of the ECJ is that, on the basis of my
discussions with experts from other European Union countries, there was no
judge or Advocate General of the court with any prior knowledge of
* Queen’s Counsel, England; B.A (First Class Honors) in Jurisprudence, Oxford University,
B.C.L., Oxford University, Eldon Scholarship, Oxford University. The author is a Bencher
(member of governing body) of Lincoln’s Inn, is authorized to sit as a Deputy High Court judge
and is a Visiting Professor in Corporate Insolvency Law at the University of Oxford.
1. See Gabriel Moss QC, Group Insolvency—Choice of Forum and Law: The European
Experience Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2007).
2. See Stuart Isaacs QC & Richard Brent, The Insolvency Regulation as a Community Legal
Instrument, in THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATEDGUIDE ¶ 2.30 (Gabriel Moss et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009); Cyril Ritter, A New Look at the
Role and Impact of Advocates-General, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 751, 754 (2006).
3.Michal Bobek, The Court of Justice of the EU, (Dep’t of Eur. Legal Studies, College of Europe,
Research Paper), available at https://www.coleurope.eu.
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insolvency law—at least when Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency
proceedings (the Regulation) came into force May 31, 2002. It would not be
suitable for an English lawyer to complain too loudly, since England has a
long tradition of the “amateur gentleman” approach to judging and only
recently accepted the notion of judges having any specific specialisms.
Even today, judicial expertise is limited to a few areas such as intellectual
property and construction, with other specialisms being quite general, such
as “Commercial,” “Chancery,” “Family,” or “Crime.”4
North American commentators tend to assume that the ECJ is a kind of
Supreme Court for the European Union. That is not so in the technical
sense. The ECJ does not decide cases,5 apart from a small minority of cases
that actually relate to the internal workings of the European Communities.6
Instead, the ECJ addresses preliminary issues that are necessary for national
courts to decide cases. The decisions of the ECJ are binding on national
courts on legal points and do not purport to decide the outcome of any case;
it is left to the national courts to decide cases by applying the legal rulings
of the ECJ.7
I. THE TRIUMPH OF THE “HEAD OFFICE FUNCTIONS” TEST
IN THE ECJ
One of the earliest issues encountered in relation to the Regulation was
the question of how to locate “the centre of main interests” (COMI) of a
subsidiary in a group registered in a different EU country from its parent.8
Under Article 3(1) of the Regulation, the location of COMI governs
jurisdiction to open main proceedings within the EU. 9 The question is
where the COMI would be located if the subsidiary traded day-to-day in the
country of registration but was run from group headquarters in a different
EU country. The answer I developed, along with my colleague Felicity
Toube QC, was to consider COMI to be where the “head office functions”
of the debtor were carried out.10 Accepted by the court in the case of Enron
Directo SA, the court held the COMI of the Spanish registered subsidiary of
Enron, under the operation of sub-group headquarters in England, was in
4. See THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 4 (Garry Slapper & David Kelly, 14th ed. 2014).
5. See Isaacs & Brent, supra note 2, ch. 2 § D.
6. SeeWYATT&DASHWOOD’S EU LAW ch. 7 (Alan Dashwood et al. eds., 6th ed. 2011).
7. Id.
8. See Council Regulation 2000/1346, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency
Regulation].
9. Id. art. 3(1).
10. The approach was first argued by us and accepted by the court in the case of Enron
Directo SA (Lightman J., July 4, 2002—no written judgment given). A summary of the case can
be found on the website of the International Insolvency Institute. Gabriel Moss, Summary of Re
Enron Directo Sociedad Limitda, INT’L INSOLVENCY INST. (June 24, 2008, 4:51:13 PM),
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/39/401.html.
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the United Kingdom, enabling English courts to open insolvency
proceedings.11
The issue of whether to apply the “head office functions” approach
arose in the first case on COMI referred to by the ECJ—In re Eurofood
IFSC Ltd. The Eurofood Court had to determine the COMI of an Irish
registered subsidiary of Parmalat, whose sole function was to raise finance
for the Italian registered Parmalat. 12 The ECJ held that mere parental
control did not rebut the statutory presumption that COMI was based on the
location of the place of registration under the Regulation.13
Following the decision of the ECJ in the Eurofood case,14 there arose a
short-lived heretical school that read the decision as having rejected the
“head office functions” approach.15 In fact, the Eurofood judgment said
nothing at all about the “head office functions” test.16 There were, however,
some supportive statements in the Advocate General’s opinion for the
“head office functions” approach.17
Nevertheless, the heretical view, based on a misunderstanding of both
Eurofood and the previous national law case law,18 got a brief outing in the
English Court of Appeal in In re Stanford International Bank Ltd case.19
This was a battle between Antiguan liquidators, appointed in the place of
incorporation of the Ponzi scheme bank and U.S. receivers. At least one
judge in the Court of Appeal seemed to think that the “head office
functions” approach was inconsistent with Eurofood on the basis that it was
not founded on “objective and ascertainable” criteria. 20 However, on a
sensible reading, the “head office functions” approach has always assumed
the use of objective and ascertainable criteria.21
In Stanford, all the overt criteria pointed to Antigua as the place of the
“centre of main interests.” 22 The fact that the Ponzi scheme may have
operated out of the United States could not change this. Both the existence
of the fraud and its centre were secret and could hardly be relevant to an
ascertainment of COMI based on objective and ascertainable facts.
The English Court of Appeal also confirmed the assumption made in
England that COMI meant the same under the EC Regulation and the
11. Id.
12. Case C-341/04, In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854 (often mistakenly cited as
“Eurofoods”).
13. Id.; EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, art. 3(1).
14. Case C-341/04, In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.
15. SeeMoss, supra note 1, at 1014–1017.
16. See id. at 1016.
17. See id. at 1016.
18. See Isaacs & Brent, supra note 2, para. 8.85 n.109.
19. In re Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 137.
20. Id. paras. 50–56.
21. See generally Isaacs & Brent, supra note 2.
22. In re Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd, para. 31.
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Model Law. 23 This meant that English courts faced with Model Law
recognition issues would follow precedent interpreting the Regulation, as in
Stanford.
The deviation in the reasoning in Stanford with respect to the “head
office functions” approach cannot now stand with the position taken in the
Interedil case decision by the ECJ.24
Interedil is one of those rare cases where considering the facts can only
confuse the reader, and people are well advised to focus only on the legal
reasoning. We have to remember that we are not looking for the holding in
a Supreme Court case, since we are not dealing with a decision of a
Supreme Court in any usual sense. Rather, we are looking for a sanctioned
interpretation of an undefined, but central, concept in the Regulation.
The ECJ judgment observed that Interedil was formed as a limited
liability company under Italian law and had its registered office in Italy.25 It
then notes that “[o]n 18 July 2001, [Interedil’s] registered office was
transferred to London (United Kingdom).”26
Unfortunately, that is not possible, at least not literally. Leaving aside
the question of a cross-border merger, which is not suggested, a de jure
transfer is impossible under English law. A de facto transfer of a registered
office can only be achieved by registering a new company in England, and
transferring the business from the Italian company before the Italian
company dissolved under Italian law.27 It is not suggested that that actually
happened.
So what did happen? The next sentence in paragraph 10 reads: “On the
same date, it was removed from the Register of Companies of the Italian
State.”28 The statement suggests the company was dissolved as an Italian
company, although no suggestion is made that there was a new company
registered in England. The judgment goes on to state that “[f]ollowing the
transfer of its registered office, Interedil was registered with the United
Kingdom Register of Companies and entered in the Register as an “FC”
(Foreign Company).”29 As previously explained, there could not—strictly
speaking—have been a “transfer” of the registered office. Furthermore, a
registration as a Foreign Company is not a form of incorporation and relates
only to the requirement to register as a company carrying on a business in
England. In fact, as a matter of logic, a foreign registered company can only
23. Id. para. 54.
24. Case C/396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R. I-9939.
25. Id. para. 10.
26. Id.
27. See GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW § 6-17 (Paul Davies et
al. eds., 9th ed. 2012).
28. Case C/396/09, Interedil Srl, para. 10.
29. Id.
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register as a foreign company doing business in England if it actually exists
under its own incorporation law.30
But it gets worse. In paragraph 11, the Court says that Interedil claims
to have been “removed from the United Kingdom Register of Companies
on 22 July 2002.”31
This probably means that Interedil ceased to be registered as a Foreign
Company doing business in England, but the move was interpreted by the
ECJ as meaning that Interedil ceased to exist.32
On October 28, 2003, an Italian bank filed a petition with the first
instance court in Bari, Italy for the opening of bankruptcy proceedings
against Interedil.33 The non-existent Interedil challenged the jurisdiction of
the Bari court on the grounds that, as a result of the “transfer” of the
registered office to the UK, only the courts of the UK had jurisdictions over
insolvency proceedings. 34 Thereafter, the procedural tangle becomes as
surreal as the facts.
On December 13, 2003, Interedil (despite its assumed non-existence)
requested that the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation give a ruling on the
preliminary issue of jurisdiction.35 However, on May 24, 2004, without
waiting for a decision from the Supreme Court of Cassation, the first
instance court in Bari ordered that Interedil be wound up.36 On June 18,
2004, Interedil lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation.37
On May 20, 2005, the Supreme Court of Cassation decided the
preliminary issue to the effect that the Italian courts had jurisdiction. It
treated Interedil as being registered in England. However, it held that the
presumption based on the place of the registered office set out in the
Regulation could be rebutted by (i) the presence of movable property in
Italy owned by Interedil, together with (ii) a lease agreement in respect of
two hotel complexes and a contract concluded with a banking institution, as
well as (iii) the fact that the Bari register of companies had not been notified
of the “transfer” of Interedil’s registered office.38
The first instance court in Bari now had a problem. On the one hand,
the ruling of its own Supreme Court of Cassation would normally bind it in
relation to preliminary issues. On the other hand, that ruling appeared to be
30. This follows from the principle that the question of whether a company exists is governed
by the law of the place where the company was purportedly incorporated. See GOWER&DAVIES'
PRINCIPLES OFMODERN COMPANY LAW, supra note 27, § 6-2.
31. Case C/396/09, Interedil Srl, para. 11.
32. Id. paras. 22–25.
33. Id. para. 12.
34. Id. para. 13.
35. Id.
36. Id. para. 14.
37. Id. para. 15.
38. Id. para. 16.
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inconsistent with the ECJ’s decision in Eurofood on the approach to COMI.
It was in these circumstances that the first instance court in Bari decided to
stay the proceedings and refer preliminary issues to the ECJ.39
Before we come to the main point about COMI, it is worth noting two
other important points that emerge from the decision of the ECJ.
Firstly, the ECJ held that, as a result of constitutional changes in the
European Union, it was now possible for even a first instance court to refer
preliminary issues to the ECJ.40 It was no longer necessary for parties to
work their way through to final appellate courts in their home jurisdiction
(or as far as possible in that direction) before a reference could be made.
Secondly, the ECJ firmly emphasized that, in any conflict between the
rulings of local appellate courts and the ECJ, the ECJ’s decision had to be
followed.41
It is now time to put behind us the factual misunderstandings and
procedural complications, which could have featured in a Rossini comic
opera. We have to accept that the ruling is based on certain facts, however
improbable. Those facts include the supposed transfer of registration to
England, followed by its supposed dissolution under English law, as
opposed to the presence of certain types of assets in Italy.42
In terms of timing, the ECJ held that, in principle, the time at which one
looks at COMI for the purposes of the allocation of international
jurisdiction within the European Union is the time at which the request is
filed to open insolvency proceedings.43 Note that the emphasis is on the
date of filing, not the date of hearing or judgment or the date on which
insolvency proceedings are to be opened. This results from the principle
that if a court has jurisdiction when a petition is filed, it does not lose
jurisdiction by reason of any subsequent events,44 a point decided in the
previous ECJ case of Staubitz-Schreiber.45
What if the debtor no longer exists? No problem—in that case, one has
to look at the place of COMI “. . . at the time when the debtor company was
removed from the Register of Companies and ceased all activities.”46
Finally, we come to the relevant criteria. Needless to say, and as
mentioned above, facts which go to rebut the presumption based on the
place of registered office (i.e., at the time of removal from the Register)
have to be objective and ascertainable by third parties “in order to ensure
39. Id. para. 17.
40. Id. paras. 18–21.
41. Id. paras. 34–40.
42. Id. paras. 10–25.
43. Id. para. 55.
44. The principle of perpetuatio fori. See MIGUEL VIRGOS& FRANCISCO GARCIMARTIN, THE
EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 54 (2004).
45. Case C-1/04, In re Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. I-719.
46. Id. para. 58.
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legal certainty and foreseeability.”47 That was already established by the
Eurofood case.
The ECJ then goes on to adopt what is, in substance, the “head office
functions” or “command and control” test for COMI. Thus, at paragraph 50:
[W]here the bodies responsible for the management and supervision of a
company are in the same place as its registered office and the management
decisions that the company had taken, in a manner that is ascertainable by
third parties, in that place, the presumption . . . that the centre of the
company’s main interest is located in that place is wholly applicable.48
However, if the facts point away from the place of the registered office,
“[t]he presumption . . . may be rebutted . . . where, from the viewpoint of
third parties, the place in which a company’s central administration is
located is not the same as that of its registered office.”49
There then follows one of those generalizations, which appellate courts
are fond of and which can be summarized as “it all depends on the facts of
each case.” The ECJ stated:
The factors to be taken into account include, in particular, all the places in
which the debtor company pursues economic activities and all those in
which it holds assets, as far as those places are ascertainable by third
parties . . . those factors must be assessed in a comprehensive manner,
account being taken of the individual circumstances of each particular
case.50
More helpfully, the ECJ then emphasizes that the key criterion is the
location of “the company’s actual centre of management and supervision
and of the management of its interests.”51 The mere presence of assets and
contracts for the financial exploitation of those assets in another Member
State, other than where the registered office is located, “cannot be regarded
as sufficient factors to rebut the presumption” based on the location of the
registered office.52
In summary, the judgment ruled:
A debtor company’s main centre of interests must be determined by
attaching greater importance to the place of the company’s central
administration, as may be established by objective factors which are
ascertainable by third parties. Where the bodies responsible for the
management and supervision of a company are in the same place as its
registered office and the management decisions of the company are taken,
47. See Case C/396/09, Interedil Srl, para. 49.
48. Id. para. 50.
49. Id. para. 51.
50. Id. para. 52.
51. Id. para. 53.
52. Id.
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in a manner that is ascertainable by third parties, in that place, the
presumption in that provision cannot be rebutted. Where a company’s
central administration is not in the same place as its registered office, the
presence of company assets and the existence of contracts for the financial
exploitation of those assets in a Member State other than that in which the
registered office is situated cannot be regarded as sufficient factors to
rebut the presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the
relevant factors makes it possible to establish, in a manner that is
ascertainable by third parties, that the company’s actual centre of
management and supervision and of the management of its interests is
located in that other Member State.53
This approach to COMI is of critical importance in the case of groups.
Prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings, “the company’s actual
centre of management and supervision and of the management of its
interests” will be where the head office functions are actually carried out.54
That, in turn, is likely to be centralized in a group situation, either in the
place of administration of the entire group or in the place of administration
of a sub-group, such as a European sub-group of a US group headquartered
in London or Paris. The administration of the group or sub-group
companies will tend to be carried out from that one place and, generally
speaking, it will be convenient to conduct a rescue or reconstruction or a
sale of the entire business of the group (or one or more of the businesses of
the group) from that one place. This is particularly so where, as often now
happens, businesses straddle across different corporate entities.
II. THE “HEAD OFFICE FUNCTIONS TEST” COMES TO THE
UNITED STATES
Whereas under the EC Regulation, the function of COMI is to
determine the allocation of jurisdiction to open main proceedings as
between different Member States of the European Union, the function of
COMI under the UNCITRAL Model Law is to act as the key criterion for
the recognition of main proceedings. This difference has affected the timing
issue: whereas COMI, for the purposes of the EC Regulation, is judged at
the time of the request being filed for the opening of insolvency
proceedings, the relevant time for judging COMI under Chapter 15 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the enactment of the Model Law in the United
States) is the time of filing the request for recognition.55 In re Fairfield
Sentry Limited v. Krys decided that COMI was to be determined at filing for
recognition. The same case also heralded the arrival of what is, in
53. Id. ruling para. 3 (emphasis added).
54. Id. para. 53.
55. Morning Mist Holdings Limited v. Kenneth Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Limited), 714
F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2013).
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substance, the “head office functions” approach in the United States and
neatly correlates with Interedil.
Fairfield Sentry was the largest feeder fund for Bernard Madoff. 56
When Madoff was arrested, Sentry’s two independent directors suspended
share redemptions and focused on winding down Sentry’s business and on
preserving assets in anticipation of litigation and bankruptcy. 57
Teleconference board meetings were initiated by Sentry’s registered agents
in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), and correspondence with shareholders
about the measures that were taken were issued from Sentry’s address in the
BVI.58 The independent directors later constituted themselves as a litigation
committee with the authority to consider, commence, and settle litigation by
or against Sentry.59 Subsequently, in July 2009, the BVI court appointed
liquidators and gave them custody and control of the assets. 60 The
liquidators ran matters from the BVI, and later applied for recognition
under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.61 Sentry’s registered office
was at all times in the BVI.62
In considering the question of the location of COMI, the Second Circuit
held that “any relevant activities, including liquidation activities as
administrative functions, may be considered in the COMI analysis.”63 They
referred to the rebuttable presumption based on the place of the registered
office and quoted a list of relevant factors from the judgment in In re
SPhinX Limited, 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006):
Various factors, singly or combined, could be relevant to such a
determination: the location of the debtor's headquarters; the location of
those who actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the
headquarters of a holding company); the location of the debtor’s primary
assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors or of a
majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or the
jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.64
The Second Circuit points out that this is a helpful guide, but
“consideration of these specific factors is neither required nor
dispositive.”65
The key point appears to emerge from a footnote where the Second
Circuit pointed out that the “principal place of business” approach




60. Id. at 131.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 130.
63. Id. at 137.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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employed in a previous case “does not control the analysis.”66 So what
does? Here we come to the crux: “But to the extent that the concepts are
similar, a court may certainly consider a debtor’s ‘nerve center’, including
from where a debtor’s activities are directed and controlled, in determining
a debtor’s COMI.”67
Thus, the Second Circuit comes into accord with the “head office
functions” or “command and control” approach in Interedil.
In applying the test, the Second Circuit quoted a finding by the
bankruptcy court:
[T]he Debtors have no place of business, no management, and no tangible
assets located in the United States. Rather, the Debtors’ activities for an
extended period of time have been conducted only in connection with
winding up the debtors’ business . . . . The Court finds that the facts now
extant provide a sufficient basis for finding that the Debtors’ COMI for the
purpose of recognition as a main proceeding as in the BVI, and not
elsewhere.68
Importantly, the Second Circuit went on to rely on the finding of the
bankruptcy court that “. . . even though Sentry had assets in other
jurisdictions, the administration of its affairs in the relevant time was
orchestrated from the BVI.”69
III. THE CURRENT POSITION
We can now see that the “head office functions” approach to COMI,
initiated in the case of Enron Directo SA in July 2002, has now been
adopted at the highest levels, both in the EU and in the United States.70 This
also involves the adoption of the English pragmatic approach taken in
Enron Directo based on the idea that the administration of the rescue,
reorganization, or sale of the business can most conveniently be carried out
at the same place as that in which it was run prior to proceedings, which, in
the case of a group, will be the group or sub-group center where the
“headquarters” functions are carried out.
IV. AVOIDING SECONDARIES
Even where main proceedings have been opened for the group
companies in one location, the smooth process of rescue can be disrupted
by the opening of a secondary proceeding in another country.71 I have
66. Id. at 138 n.10.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 138.
69. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
70. Moss, supra note 1, at 1010.
71. Id. at 1017.
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explained the technique used in Collins & Aikman 72 in which the UK
administrators of the UK main proceedings for non-UK, but EU-registered
group companies, met with committees of local creditors and dissuaded
them from applying for the opening of secondary proceedings in return for
assurances that local law priorities would be respected.73 This approach was
mostly successful, and the legal problems were solved in the judgment.74
Thus, unnecessary and disruptive secondaries in other EU countries
have been avoided by means of undertakings promising to respect local
priorities. Such undertakings are, however, not necessarily available in all
other EU countries. The process used in England is admired abroad and has
acquired the name “synthetic secondary.” It is considered to be so useful
that the European Commission has suggested that it be legislated for all EU
countries affected by the Regulation by means of an amendment to the
Regulation.75 A statutory amendment expressly giving such powers to main
liquidators in all Member States would obviously be useful. This is yet
another pragmatic solution to what might otherwise be an impractical legal
situation.
As far as England is concerned, this development of “synthetic
secondaries” has been followed up and consolidated. In Nortel 76 —a
massive collapse affecting Canada, United States, Europe, and others—the
UK administrators in the UK main proceedings for the various non-UK
European registered companies obtained the permission of the English court
to give the types of undertakings I have just mentioned.77 The court gave
permission and, again, the opening of secondaries was generally avoided,
leading to a beneficial sale of the various businesses of the group.78
One of the concerns of the Nortel case was that, in some European
jurisdictions, notice of a request to the local court to open a secondary
proceeding might not be given to the UK main proceeding administrators.
Accordingly, the UK main administrator might not get an opportunity to
oppose such an opening as both unnecessary and destructive of value.
In the case of Rover,79 the Court of Appeal of Versailles on December
15, 2005 had declined to open secondary French proceedings in a case
where that was unnecessary for the protection of local interests or the
72. Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343.
73. Id. para. 8.
74. See generally id.
75. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 On Insolvency Proceedings, sec. 3.1.3, COM (2012) 744
final.
76. Re Nortel Networks SA, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206.
77. Id. para. 14.
78. See generally id.
79. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 2006, I.L.Pr.32 (Fr.).
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realization of assets. The court stated that the UK main proceeding
administrators had argued,
[W]ithout contradiction that the insolvency proceedings are progressing
without difficulty, and that they are preserving the interests of all
concerned; they hold that single proceedings permit continuation of
activity and hence sale of vehicles over a longer period, and allow co-
ordination of the sales operations throughout the territory of Europe; in
their eyes secondary insolvency proceedings would multiply costs and
formalities to no purpose.80
On the basis of that, the Court of Appeal of Versailles concluded that it
“does not appear to be demonstrated that the opening of secondary
proceedings would offer advantages in this case, in particular by improving
the protection of local interests or the realization of assets.”81
This decision was encouraging in suggesting that secondary
proceedings should not be allowed to disrupt main proceedings unless there
is some particular purpose, such as the protection of local interests or the
realization of assets.82 In most cases under the Regulation, realization of
assets does not require a local proceeding, since the main administrator’s
powers of disposal extend throughout the EU (except Denmark) and the
focus is on the protection of local interests.83 The type of undertaking given
in both Collins & Aikman and Nortel sufficiently protected local interests
by ensuring that local law priorities relating to distribution were to be
respected. Accordingly, there is no practical point of interest in opening
secondary proceedings.
As a matter of procedure, however, main administrators would want to
be as certain as possible that they would actually get notice of any request
to open a secondary proceeding, so that such arguments could be deployed.
In view of the fact that such notice is not required in all the countries in the
EU, a new approach was developed in Nortel.
At the request of the UK administrators in the main proceedings, the
judge in England agreed to send out “letters of request” to all the relevant
European courts asking them to ensure that notice was given to the UK
main administrators of any request to open a secondary proceeding, so as to
enable them to oppose any such request.84 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some European courts were rather surprised by the request, but no court
expressly rejected the approach. In any event, the efficacy of the tactic was
not tested.
80. Id. para. 46.
81. Id. para. 47.
82. See also discussion infra of Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v.
Christianapol sp. z o.o., (Nov. 22, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu.
83. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, art. 18(3).
84. Re Nortel Networks SA, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 206 para. 14.
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V. WINDING UP ANDWINDING DOWN ACTIVITY
Recalling Fairfield Sentry, the Second Circuit regarded the activities of
the independent directors, and later the liquidators, in winding down and
winding up the company’s affairs as being relevant to the question of the
location of COMI. An analogous issue has arisen in England in relation to
the criterion of “establishment,” which, under the EC Regulation, must be
sufficiently shown before there can be jurisdiction to open a secondary
proceeding. Subject to some differences in wording, the “establishment”
criterion is the key criterion for the recognition of non-main proceedings
under the Model Law and Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.85
Establishment has been addressed in the case of In re Olympic Airlines
SA.86 The Greek company Olympic Airlines was liquidated through main
proceedings in Greece and transferred its airline business to the United
Kingdom. The English Court of Appeal held that the activities at the
London branch of Olympic Airlines were insufficient “establishment” for
the purposes of opening secondary proceedings in England.87 The U.K.
Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal from this decision in early
February 2015.
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
The EC Regulation does not expressly deal with potential conflicts
between main and secondary proceedings. Recital (20) in the Preamble to
the Regulation does, however, refer to the “dominant role of the main
insolvency proceedings.”88 There are detailed rules in the Regulation to
ensure that the main proceedings remain dominant. For example, secondary
proceedings opened after a main proceeding can only be liquidation
proceedings.89 The liquidator or administrator in the main proceeding has
special rights such as applying for a stay of the process of liquidation in the
secondary proceeding or proposing a plan of reorganization.90
With regard to the question of a dispute as to whether a particular asset
falls within the main or secondary proceedings, a preliminary issue has
been referred by the Versailles first instance court to the ECJ in the matter
of the French Nortel Company.91
85. See U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, art. 17(2)(b), U.N. Sales No.
E.14.V.2 (1997); 11 USC § 1517(b)(2).
86. Re Olympic Airlines SA, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 1413.
87. Id.
88. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, recital 20.
89. Id. art. 3(3).
90. Id. arts. 33–34.
91. Case C-649/13, Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks and Others, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CN0649&from=EN.
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The original proceeding was brought by employees who claimed to be
entitled to certain severance payments.92 In addition to claiming that the
payments were due, they have also tried to raise a question as to whether
certain assets fall within the main or secondary proceedings. The French
liquidator, who was a party to this proceeding, has in effect, joined the UK
administrators in the main proceedings on the basis that the question
relating to the attribution of assets affects the rights in the main
proceedings. The preliminary issue raises the question of whether the
French court, as the court of the secondary proceedings, actually has
jurisdiction to hear a dispute about the correct allocation of assets, as
opposed to the court of the main proceeding. There is also the issue of
whether the question of allocation can be judged in accordance with
national law or whether the rules as to deemed location of assets contained
in Article 2(g) of the Regulation override national law.
VII. WIDER ISSUES ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF MAIN AND
SECONDARY PROCEEDINGS
The ECJ had to grapple with some tricky issues relating to the
relationship between main and secondary proceedings in a group situation
in the case of Bank Handlowy v. Christianapol sp. z.o.o.93
The debtor company, Christianapol, was registered in Poland but its
ultimate parent was a French company.94 On October 1, 2008, the French
first instance (French court) court at Meaux opened what the French regard
as pre-insolvency proceedings against Christianapol on the basis that COMI
was in France. 95 The type of proceedings opened were “sauveguarde”
proceedings, which are, strictly speaking, not insolvency proceedings, but
pre-insolvency or reorganization proceedings.96 Nevertheless, they are (by
subsequent amendment procured by France) listed in Annex A of the
Insolvency Regulation as an insolvency proceeding.97
Subsequently, in April and June 2009, the bank, as creditor of the
company, requested a court in Poland to open secondary insolvency
proceedings.98 On July 20, 2009, the French court approved a rescue plan
for the debtor company under which debts would be paid off in installments
spread over 10 years. 99 There was a prohibition on the transfer of the
92. The following discussion is based on the author’s personal knowledge gained while co-
drafting the English administrators’ submissions to the ECJ.
93. Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v. Christianapol sp. z.o.o., (Nov. 22,
2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
94. Id. para. 17.
95. Id. para. 18.
96. Id. paras. 51–53.
97. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, ann. A.
98. Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy, para. 19.
99. Id. para. 20.
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business in Poland and of certain defined assets belonging to the debtor.100
Amongst other things, the French court appointed a person to oversee the
implementation of the plan.101
The debtor argued, among other things, that the claims of the bank and
other creditors had been compromised by the French rescue plan and the
claims could not be used to apply for secondary proceedings in Poland.102
The debtor wanted the application for the opening of secondary proceedings
to be dismissed.103
The ECJ was left to tackle some tricky issues. Firstly, as I pointed out
in my 2007 article, the text of the Regulation was out of date by the time the
Regulation was brought. 104 It assumed that proceedings would be
insolvency proceedings and did not really cater, at least expressly, for
rescue or reorganization proceedings.105 It also assumed that debtors would
be insolvent, according to domestic law criteria, before they entered any of
the proceedings falling within the Regulation.106 It is on this basis that
Article 27 of the Regulation appears to provide that, when one seeks the
opening of a secondary proceeding, one does not have to reargue the issue
of insolvency: this is conclusively presumed from the opening of the main
proceeding.107
In addition to the non-insolvency proceedings listed in Annex A of the
Regulation, EU Member States were allowed to add proceedings that were
very clearly not insolvency proceedings by Continental Europe standards,
but are referred to as “pre-insolvency proceedings.” The French
sauveguarde procedure is a very good example. It is meant to be a pre-
insolvency proceeding, which prevents insolvency under French law from
ever occurring. If one has reached insolvency in the French law sense, it is
too late and an insolvency proceeding must be filed.108
One question that arose in the Bank Handlowy case was the position the
Polish court should take when faced with a request for the opening of a
secondary proceeding. The main proceeding had been a sauveguarde
proceeding opened specifically on the basis that the debtor was not
insolvent under French law. Logically, the prior question was whether the
Polish court had to accept the sauveguarde proceeding as being within the
Regulation at all. For this purpose, the ECJ had to reconcile Article 1(1),
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. para. 22.
103. Id.
104. SeeMoss, supra note 1, at 1005.
105. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8.
106. See id.
107. Id. art. 27.
108. See PHILLIPWOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY § 6-055 (2d ed. 2007).
2014] Group Insolvency – Influence of English Pragmatism 265
“[t]his Regulation shall apply to collective insolvency proceedings . . . ”109
and Article 2(a), which, for the purposes of the Regulation, defines
“insolvency proceedings” as being the collective proceedings referred to in
Article 1(1).110 So far, so circular. However, Article 2(a) goes on to say,
“[t]hese proceedings are listed in Annex A.”111
By the time of the Bank Handlowy case, the French pre-insolvency
sauveguarde proceeding had come to be listed in Annex A. The only way
out of the circle was to go to Annex A, and the ECJ appears to have
accepted that the sauveguarde proceeding had to be treated as an insolvency
proceeding within the Regulation despite the fact that it is very clearly in
fact a pre-insolvency proceeding.112
The consequential effect of having to treat the sauveguarde proceeding
as an insolvency proceeding was that Article 27 secondary proceedings
could be opened “without the debtor’s insolvency being examined” in
Poland. 113 In other words, since the main pre-insolvency proceeding in
France had to be treated as an insolvency proceeding, the pre-insolvent
company was treated as insolvent in Poland.
Unsurprisingly, the court in Poland had tried to find out whether the
French main proceedings were extant or closed following implementation
of the plan of reorganization. They had not been able to get a clear answer
out of the French court. The ECJ therefore stated, logically, that if French
proceedings have been closed, the Polish court cannot be asked to open a
secondary proceeding. Moreover, the Polish court could not open a new
main proceeding unless it could be shown that the debtor’s COMI had been
transferred to Poland after the opening of the main proceedings in France.114
Alternatively, if the French proceedings are considered extant, the
question then is whether or not the Polish court should take steps that might
undermine the plan of reorganization under the main proceedings. In its
judgment, the ECJ points out that opening a secondary proceeding in that
type of situation (i.e., where the main proceeding is a rescue proceeding,
and where the secondary proceeding has to be a winding up proceeding
under Article 3(3) of the Regulation) “risks running counter to the purpose
served by main proceedings, which are of a protective nature.”115
The ECJ then points out that there are a number of mandatory rules of
co-ordination “intended to ensure . . . the need for unity in the Community .
109. EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
110. Id. art. 2(a).
111. Id.
112. Case C-116/11, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA v. Christianapol sp. z o.o., para. 63,
(Nov. 22, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu.
113. Id. para. 74.
114. Id. para. 43.
115. Id. para. 59.
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. . the main proceedings have a dominant role in relation to the secondary
proceeding . . . .”116
The ECJ judgment also refers to certain “prérogatives” of the liquidator
in the main proceedings “which allow him to influence the secondary
proceedings in such a way that the protected purpose of the main
proceedings is not jeopardized.”117 The judgment refers to Article 33(1) and
the potential request by the main liquidator for a renewable stay of the
process of liquidation in the secondary proceeding for up to three months.118
Reference is also made to Article 34(1) and the ability of the main
liquidator to propose a closure of the secondary proceedings with a rescue
plan, composition, or comparable measure.119 There is also reference to
Article 34(3), which provides that during the stay of the process of
liquidation under Article 33(1), only the liquidator in the main proceedings
or the debtor may propose measures closing the secondary proceeding by a
rescue plan, composition, or comparable measure.120
At paragraph 62, the ECJ refers to the principle of sincere co-
operation.121 This requires the court having jurisdiction to open secondary
proceedings to respect the objectives of the main proceedings and to take
into account the scheme of the Regulation.122 The Regulation has the aim of
ensuring efficient and effective cross-border insolvency proceedings
through mandatory co-ordination of the main and secondary proceedings,
guaranteeing the priority of the main proceedings.123
I detect a strong hint here that the ECJ is suggesting to the Polish court
that if the French proceedings still subsist, then the Polish court should not
open secondary proceedings if it will disrupt the plan of reorganization in
the main proceeding.
The ECJ judgment in Bank Handlowy does not explore what would
actually happen if a secondary proceeding were opened. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the effect of opening a secondary proceeding, pursuant to Articles
3(2) and 27, is that the assets in the territory of the Member State in which
the secondary proceeding is opened are subtracted from the assets subject to
the main proceedings.124 Thus, if the plan of reorganization in the main
proceedings relies upon the availability of those assets (as in Bank
Handlowy) they can, in theory, be taken out of the main proceeding, thereby
116. Id. para. 60.




121. Id. para. 62.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 8, art. 3(2), 27.
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undermining the plan or reorganization. However, the court being asked to
open a secondary proceeding should not allow that to happen.
CONCLUSION
The “head office functions” approach to COMI has enabled a pragmatic
solution to be reached in relation to COMI and groups. On such a test, it is
easy to find that COMI for group companies is centralized at the place
where the group or sub-group headquarters’ functions are actually carried
out, as long as that can be approved by objective evidence and is
ascertainable to third parties. This enables the group to be rescued or
beneficially realized after the start of proceedings as well as being run
efficiently before proceedings are started.
The practice that has developed has led to references being made to
there being a “group COMI,” although we must never forget that this is not
a legally sound concept.
English courts and practitioners in the area of insolvency and
restructuring have long found practical solutions on a pragmatic basis in
which legal concepts and rules become our tools rather than our masters.
The British pragmatism reflected in this approach has found favor in other
EU Member States in some cases, and has certainly found favor with the
European Commission. We can only hope that in the current consideration
of proposed amendments to the Regulation, the European Parliament and
the European Council will also adopt a pragmatic and practical approach.
